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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a scenario that now occurs with increasing frequency in the offices
of lawyers and their clients everywhere: In responding to discovery requests
and assessing the universe of what might be considered relevant, files are
searched and hard drives are scoured, and then someone pipes up "What
about the Facebook posts?" In the Digital Age, evidence gleaned from online
sources-particularly content from social networking sites like Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, Linkedln, and others-has assumed a front and center
role in all types of litigation. Social media content can be game-changing
evidence, whether one seeks something to contradict personal injury claims
of physical limitations, evidence to undermine a company's defenses in a
complex commercial dispute, or proof of consumer confusion in a trademark
infringement suit. This is due, in part, to the pervasiveness of social media
and the sheer volume of content that social media users generate. Facebook,
founded in 2004, now boasts over 1.12 billion users worldwide. In the United
States, Facebook users generate over 30 billion pieces of content in a given
month, and Twitter processes approximately 400 million tweets in a given
day. According to the latest Pew Research Center survey, 72% of American
adults use social networks.' Corporate America has fervently embraced so-
cial networking as well. According to a 2013 survey by Modern Survey and
DHR International, roughly 9 out of 10 (88%) of business executives use
LinkedIn "often" or "very often."2 The majority of the executives surveyed
reported using social media on a daily basis.3 In 2013, a survey by
BRANDfog asked employees about CEOs' social media use, and 81% of the
respondents said they considered executives who engaged in social media to
be better equipped than their peers to lead companies in the contemporary
* Administrative partner of the Dallas office of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP, where he handles a wide variety of civil litigation, including cyber-
liability and technology-related legal issues. He received his B.A. with general
and departmental honors from Rutgers University in 1986 and his J.D. from the
University of Texas School of Law in 1989. He is the author of The Lawyer's
Guide to Social Networking: Understanding Social Media's Impact on the Law
(West 2010), and two other forthcoming books on social media and the law.
1. Joanna Brenner & Aaron Smith, 72% of Online Adults are Social Networking
Site Users, PEw RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/
social-networking-sites.aspxd (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
2. T.J. McCue, LinkedIn is Preferred by Executives, DHR INTERNATIONAL, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/04/09/linkedin-is-preferred-by-executives
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
3. Id.
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business environment.4 The respondents regarded executives who used social
media as more likely to improve engagement with stockholders, communi-
cate better with customers and employees alike, and improve the business'
brand image.5
In addition, in-house counsel have witnessed firsthand social network-
ing's importance, not only as a tool, but as a source of critical evidence.
According to a study by Greentarget, Zeughauser Group, and Inside Counsel,
more than 67% of in-house attorneys report having used sites like Linkedln
within the past day or week.6 Moreover, the 2013 Annual Survey by In-
House Counsel by Norton Rose Fulbright LLP revealed that 20% of corpo-
rate counsel have had to collect social media content from their employees,
whether in the course of production in formal discovery during litigation or
in the course of internal investigations.7
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended, effective
December 1, 2006, to address issues related to preserving, disclosing, or
seeking electronically-stored information (ESI), social networking was in its
infancy and its paradigm-shifting impact on how people communicate and
share information was yet to be felt. With the inexorable spread of social
media, and as these sites have become fertile ground for both formal and
informal discovery, it is more vital than ever for attorneys, on both sides of
the docket and every practice area, to be aware of their clients'-and their
own-obligations regarding the preservation of such evidence and the conse-
quences of spoliating this evidence. While the concept of preserving or de-
stroying paper documents or tangible physical evidence is easy to grasp, ESI
in general and social networking content in particular pose unique chal-
lenges. After all, the mere act of opening a document in Microsoft Word, or
copying it to a mobile storage device, results in changes to that document
system's metadata.8 In addition, to be used, data must first be interpreted
through the use of a particular application (or a particular version of that
application). The preservation of data also entails the preservation of the ap-
plications needed to correctly interpret the data. Furthermore, a hard drive
4. 2013 CEO, Social Media & Leadership Survey, BRANDFOG, http://www.brand
fog.com/CEOSocialMediaSurvey/BRANDfog_2013_CEOSurvey.pdf (last
visited Oct. 15, 2103).
5. Id.
6. The 2012 In-House New Media Engagement Survey, GREENTARGET, http://
www.greentarget.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012GTZGICSurveyRe
portFinal-WebsiteVersion.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
7. Fulbright's 9th Annual Litigation Trends Survey: Litigation Bounces Back;
Regulation Hits High-U.S. Release, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www
.nortonrosefulbright.com/us/news/93066/fulbrights-9th-annual-litigation-
trends-survey-litigation-bounces-back-regulation-hits-high-us-release (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2013).
8. Metadata is, in fact, data about data.
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constantly changes and recycles its contents, which creates a document that
may overwrite an earlier version. In terms of social media in particular, the
dynamic nature of a social networking profile can further complicate things
as profile pictures, newsfeeds, lists of friends, etc., often change rapidly.
The changes to the Federal Rules in 2006, the increasing significance of
electronic discovery (e-discovery), and milestone rulings in cases like the
Zubulake series of decisions 9 have all combined to make preservation and
spoliation of electronic evidence in general a popular topic for discussion
among practitioners and legal academics alike. However, to date, there has
been no analysis of evidence preservation and spoliation in the social media
context. This article aims to fill that void. What constitutes spoliation in the
age of Facebook and Twitter, and how are courts around the country dealing
with the failure to preserve evidence from such sites? Even more intriguing,
what are the implications for spoliation of evidence in an era in which "de-
lete" is no longer tantamount to obliteration from the information landscape,
and in which enterprising technology companies offer applications like
Snapchat, in which the communication purportedly self-destructs and is not
preserved? Because the August 2012 Amendments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct include a change in what is considered competent rep-
resentation (lawyers must now keep abreast not only of changes in the law
and its practice, but also of "the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology") attorneys must be sufficiently conversant in social media to
ethically and competently advise their clients.lo The unwary attorney, in at-
tempting to navigate the often murky waters of social media use, must be
aware of ethical restrictions, particularly when it comes to preserving and not
spoliating social media content." May a lawyer direct his client to delete or
take down potentially damaging or incriminating tweets or Facebook posts?
Is it okay for a lawyer to advise a client to place once publicly-viewable
content behind a privacy setting or screen? In answering these questions and
others, the discussion of pertinent case authority (and at least one ethics opin-
ion to date), in this article underscores the truism that the law can never truly
hope to catch up with the leaps and bounds of technology.
This article aims to provide a better understanding of evidence preserva-
tion and spoliation in the age of social networking by examining the sources
of the duty to preserve evidence; by looking at how the courts' treatment of
9. Zubulake v. U.B.S. Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
10. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLU-
TION 105A (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/ethics 2020/20120808_revised resolution 105a asamen
ded.authcheckdam.pdf (specifically, changes to Rule 1.1, cmt. 6).
I1. For a lengthier discussion of the potential ethical pitfalls posed by attorneys'
use and misuse of social media, see generally John G. Browning, Keep Your
"Friends" Close and Your Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in
the Use of Social Media, 3 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 204
(2013).
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spoliation of ESI generally informs the discussion of social media evidence
in particular; by analyzing those cases involving spoliation of social media
content; and by discussing the potential impact of new technology and appli-
cations on existing duties of evidence preservation. For attorneys, the liti-
gants they represent, and the judges charged with applying and interpreting
the law, the popularity and metrics of social media, combined with a seem-
ingly never-ending parade of technological innovations, can be daunting, to
say the least. This article hopes to demystify these concepts and provide
helpful guidance.
II. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE
A. Ethical Obligations
At the most fundamental level, lawyers have an ethical obligation, inde-
pendent of the duties imposed on their clients, to preserve evidence. Most
state ethical rules governing evidence preservation and addressing spoliation
are derived from Rule 3.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
This Rule prohibits a lawyer from unlawfully altering or destroying evidence
and from assisting others in doing so.12 Specifically, under the heading of
"Fairness to Opposing Party and to Counsel," it states that a lawyer shall not
"unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value ... or counsel or assist another person to do any such act."l3 The Texas
analogue to this is found in Rule 3.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct. Under the heading of "Fairness in Adjudicatory Pro-
ceedings," it states that lawyers shall not "(a) unlawfully obstruct another
party's access to evidence; in anticipation of a dispute unlawfully alter, de-
stroy, or conceal a document or other material that a competent lawyer would
believe has potential or actual evidentiary value; or counsel or assist another
person to do any such act."l4 California, the only state that has not adopted
the ABA Model Rules, sets forth its ethical prohibition against spoliating
evidence in California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-220, Suppression of
Evidence.15 This rule provides that "A member shall not suppress any evi-
dence that the member or the member's client has a legal obligation to reveal
or to produce."16
To date, only one ethics opinion has addressed an attorney's ethical ob-
ligations regarding the preservation or spoliation of a client's social media
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2012).
13. Id.
14. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.04 (West 2005).





content.' 7 While this recent ethics opinion from the New York County Law-
yers Association (NYCLA) is discussed in greater detail later on in this arti-
cle, it bears noting here that although the opinion controversially states that
an attorney may direct a client to remove or "take down" certain materials
from an existing social media site, a more mainstream approach appears else-
where in the opinion.18 The NYCLA opinion notes that as part of an attor-
ney's duty to competently represent clients, he or she may advise the client
about the implications of the client's social media activities.19 However, the
opinion went on to observe that, following New York Rules of Professional
Conduct, a lawyer shall not "(a)(1) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or
the client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce . . . [nor] (3) conceal or
knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to
reveal."20
NYCLA Ethics Opinion 745 does note that while "[a]ttorneys' duties
not to suppress or conceal evidence involve questions of substantive law and
are therefore outside the purview of an ethics opinion,"21 it does take the time
to reference this substantive law. For example, the opinion states that, fol-
lowing certain New York state precedent, there may be a duty to preserve
"potential evidence" in advance of any actual discovery request. 22
B. Other Sources of the Duty to Preserve Evidence
Besides the ethical obligations incumbent upon the attorney and which
govern the attorney's relationship with his or her client, the duty imposed on
a party to preserve evidence may be rooted in common law, statutory, regula-
tory, or court-ordered obligations. The common law of many states imposes a
duty on a party to preserve evidence when the party knows or reasonably
should know that (1) there is a substantial likelihood that a claim or litigation
will be filed; and (2) evidence in the party's possession or control will be
material and relevant to such a claim.23 Statutory and regulatory duties to
preserve evidence are inherent in those laws and regulations that mandate
that certain types of records shall be preserved for specific periods of time.
These include, for example, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.40 (requiring a two-year reten-
tion of school personnel or employment records), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4
17. N.Y. CNTY. LAWYERS Ass'N, ETHICS Op. 745: ADVISING A CLIENT REGARDING
PosTs ON SOCIAL MEDIA SITES (2013) available at http://www.nycla.org/site
Files/Publications/Publications1630_0.pdf [hereinafter "NYCLA Opinion"].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing VOOM HD Holdings L.L.C. v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 93 A.D.3d
33 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)).
23. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2003).
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(specifying a six-year retention of certain brokerage firm records), or, on a
state level, Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 72.002 (stipulating
a three-year retention of business records that are required to be kept by the
state, unless another law specifically provides otherwise).24
In addition, a court order may impose a duty to preserve evidence. This
is particularly true in the social media context, where parties frequently seek
judicial intervention when concerned about potential alteration or deletion of
profile content. One such example arose during a class action suit that pitted
(parents of) girls who suffered from eating disorders against the health insur-
ance carrier who declined them coverage. 25 During the course of litigation,
defendant requested e-mails, journals, diaries, and online writings from so-
cial networking sites wherein which plaintiffs' beneficiaries' discussed eat-
ing disorders and related health conditions. 26 A lengthy and contentious
dispute arose over discoverability of this social media content. 27 Ultimately,
U.S. Magistrate Judge Patty Schwartz ordered preservation of the social
networking evidence at issue, including all communications shared via social
media.28
Parties increasingly address preservation of social media content during
discovery prior to a judge's order. This can include sending preservation let-
ters prior to or in conjunction with formal discovery requests. Additionally,
parties may request opposition preserve and store social networking content
by use of readily available technology. For example, Facebook offers a
"Download My Information" "Expanded Archive" mechanism. Essentially,
this mechanism is a data export tool that permits the user to store her entire
profile-from the first profile picture to the last wall post-to a zip file for
easy retrieval. Use of this data export feature has become ubiquitous enough
that parties faced with discovery requests (sometimes for their entire
Facebook profile) are now making use of it as a way of preserving their
Facebook data in electronic format.29
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.40 (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2013); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 72.002 (West 2009).
25. See generally Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, 568 F. Supp. 2d 556
(D.N.J. 2008); Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100915, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007) (denying plaintiffs order to re-
consider previous order to turn over documents and ordering documents be
turned over to defendant).
26. Beye, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100915, at *3.
27. See generally id.
28. Id. at *13.
29. Id. See also, e.g., Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94139
(S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013). Plaintiffs who claimed to have sustained personal
injuries while at the defendant's theme park received request to use Facebook's
"Download My Information" feature as a way of maintaining their entire
Facebook profile pending resolution of any discovery disputes. Id.
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Applicable rules of civil procedure also address the preservation of elec-
tronic evidence, albeit often more by implication. For example, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) mandates that parties, in their initial dis-
closures, provide either copies or a description of ESI (by category and loca-
tion) that supports a party's claims or defenses.30 Under Rule 26(f),
preservation of ESI must be discussed when parties are required to "meet and
confer".31 In Texas, which promulgated its rule regarding ESI in 1999 (seven
years before the federal rules were changed) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
196.4 provides that parties seeking ESI must request the production of elec-
tronic data and specify the form of production requested. 32 Producing parties,
on the other hand, must provide ESI that is "responsive" and "reasonably
available to the responding party in its ordinary course of business." 33
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SPOLIATION OF
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE GENERALLY
Concerns over spoliation of evidence were around long before the exis-
tence of electronic evidence; in fact, spoliation concerns have probably per-
sisted for as long as evidence itself. For example, in the 18th century English
case of a jeweler who had wrongfully kept the stone from a ring brought to
him for appraisal, the court instructed the jury to "presume the strongest case
against the jeweler and make the value of the best jewels the measure of
damages" (since the stone was no longer available for valuing).34 But with
the more ephemeral world of digital evidence, concerns over spoliation are
enhanced. Not surprisingly, courts in recent years have developed a body of
jurisprudence centered on preservation and spoliation of ESI. For example, in
one of the seminal Zubulake opinions, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York delineated the responsi-
bility for attorneys dealing with clients in possession of relevant electronic
information.35 According to Judge Scheindlin, attorneys have a duty to (1) be
familiar with the client's computer system and document retention policies;
(2) issue a litigation hold; (3) speak directly with the client's "key players"
about preservation duties; (4) tell all employees to produce electronic copies
of relevant electronic files; and (5) identify all backup media and make sure
it is preserved.36
Over the years, the cases that discuss preservation have refined and
honed key concepts. Since the duty to preserve evidence "does not exceed
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
32. TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.4.
33. Id.
34. Armory v. Delamirie, 92 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
35. Zubulake v. U.B.S. Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
36. Id.
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beyond evidence that is relevant and material to the claims at issue in the
litigation," a number of cases have focused on precisely what constitutes
"relevant evidence."37 For example, in a recent consumer fraud case, the
judge declined to impose spoliation sanctions on the defendant cable com-
pany for its failure to preserve phone recordings.3 8 There was no evidence to
suggest that the deleted call recordings were relevant and supported the
plaintiffs claim.39 While the court agreed that two of the three requirements
under California's three-prong test were met-the party with control over the
evidence had an obligation to preserve it, and the records were destroyed
negligently-the critical third requirement that the destroyed evidence be rel-
evant was simply not met.40
This article will later explore how evidence from social networking sites
poses even greater spoliation concerns than other forms of ESI. Such addi-
tional concerns are due to a variety of factors. For one, volume of communi-
cations (the number of Facebook posts, tweets, etc.) for an individual can
easily run into the thousands. Moreover, use of social networking is casual
yet pervasive. Additionally, users frequently update their profiles with new
profile pictures or other changes. Finally, a variety of data can be resident on
a single social networking profile (from photos and video to audio record-
ings, text, etc.).
One problem that arises as a result of multiple courts having addressed
spoliation issues (at least in the federal context) is the degree of inconsis-
tency, in terms of both results and sanctions imposed. For precisely this rea-
son (and the resulting concerns over uncertainty and unpredictable
sanctions), the United States Courts' Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has
included a proposed amendment to Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.41 This amendment "is intended to create a uniform national stan-
dard regarding the level of culpability required to justify severe sanctions for
spoliation."42 In essence, it would create two categories of measures a court
may impose when it finds that a party failed to preserve information needed
for litigation purposes. The first category includes "remedies" and other "cur-
37. See generally Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 565893
(N.D. Col. Jan. 5, 2006).




41. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REVISION OF RULE 37(E) AS APPROVED FOR
PUBLICATION 35 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules
AndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2013-04.pdf.
42. Henry Kelston, Are We on the Cusp of Major Changes to E-Discovery Rules?,




ative" steps short of being considered "sanctions."43 For instance, a court
may require a party "recreate or obtain" lost information, conduct additional
discovery to compensate for the missing data, or pay "reasonable expenses
resulting from the loss of the information" at issue.44 The second category of
measures to be included in the proposed rule is already listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A) as appropriate for use when a party violates a court order to
comply with discovery. Accordingly, a court may strike a party's pleadings,
dismiss the action in whole or in part, preclude certain evidence from being
introduced or issues from being raised, or give the jury an instruction that it
may draw an adverse inference from the absence of such evidence.45
Arguably the most debated section of the proposed amendment provides
the court may impose sanctions or order an adverse jury instruction only if it
finds either the failure to preserve caused "substantial prejudice" and was
"willful or in bad faith;" or "irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful
opportunity" to litigate the claims in the case.46 The court may determine the
"willful or in bad faith" factor (meriting more extreme sanctions) by examin-
ing the extent to which a party was on notice of probable litigation, and/or
the reasonableness of a party's efforts to preserve information that was ulti-
mately lost.47
Those critical of the proposed amendment to Rule 37(e) apparently in-
clude Judge Shira Scheindlin, a towering figure in the world of electronic
discovery. Judge Scheindlin is renowned for her highly influential decisions
in Zubulake as well as Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pen-
sion Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC.48 In a recent breach of contract
case, Judge Scheindlin sanctioned plaintiffs Sekisui America Corp. and
Sekisui Medical Co. for deleting emails and failing to institute a litigation
hold for fifteen months; a failure she termed "inexcusable given that Sekisui
is the plaintiff in this case and, as such, had full knowledge of the possibility
of future litigation."49 Noting that "prejudice is presumed precisely because
relevant evidence-i.e., evidence presumed to be unfavorable to the spoliat-
ing party-has been intentionally destroyed and is no longer available to the
innocent party," Judge Scheindlin left no doubt as to her position on the
proposed amendment to Rule 37(e). The judge wrote, "I do not agree that the






48. See generally Zubulake v. U.B.S. Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
2010 WL 184312 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010).
49. Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart, Case No. 1:12-cv-03479 SAS FM, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115533, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013).
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intentional misconduct should fall on the innocent party. Furthermore, im-
posing sanctions only where evidence is destroyed willfully or in bad faith
creates perverse incentives and encourages sloppy behavior."50 The court hit
Sekisui with an adverse jury instruction as well as costs and fees to be deter-
mined at a later date.51
Courts previously dealt with spoliation issues in other manners of ESI,
including text messages, 52 digital photos from a cellphone camera, 53 and e-
mail.54 As noted earlier, all of these forms of ESI (amongst other forms) are
often found on a typical social networking profile. Under both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and many state counterparts, spoliation sanctions
may not be imposed when ESI is lost as a result of "routine, good faith
operation of an electronic information system," absent exceptional circum-
stances. 55 Consequently, routine deletion of Facebook wall posts or altering
profile pictures will not rise to the level of spoliation unless a party has no-
tice that this content is relevant to pending or "reasonably foreseeable" litiga-
tion. Pre-suit demand letters and even an oral threat of litigation have been
held to trigger the duty to preserve evidence.56 In one instance, a court held
that a community college's duty to preserve ESI arose once it merely became
aware of sexual assault allegations against a professor (long before suit was
ever filed or even threatened).57
In the social media context, it is important to keep in mind that spolia-
tion encompasses not just the destruction of evidence, but its alteration, as
well, or where a party fails "'to preserve property for another's use as evi-
dence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.' "58 For example, in a
sexual harassment claim, it should come as no surprise that the plaintiff who
alters her Facebook profile to replace risqu6 or suggestive photos with more
demure ones casts doubt on her claims, and has engaged in a form of spolia-
50. Id.
51. Id. The timing of this ruling could prove meaningful, given that it was handed
down shortly after the proposed amendment was released for comments.
52. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9034, at *39 (D. Col. Jan.
20, 2013).
53. Evans v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 102654/09, at *3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Jan.
9, 2013).
54. VOOM HD Holdings L.L.C. v. EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., 93 A.D.3d 33, 43
(N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
56. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Hummer Winblad Venture Partners (In re
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation), 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1069 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
57. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 377 (D. Conn. 2007).




tion. An example "ripped from the headlines" of social media spoliation is
seen in the criminal prosecution of former Rutgers student Dharun Ravi for
the cyber-harassment of his roommate, Tyler Clementi, which occurred prior
to Clementi's suicide.59 Ravi not only attempted to electronically broadcast
Clementi in an intimate episode with another man via webcam, but he also
sent various tweets about his activities.60 After Clementi's suicide, Ravi went
back and attempted to delete and alter his tweets to make them seem more
benign; the result was a charge of obstruction of evidence.61
As the discussion later on in this article of specific cases of social media
spoliation will reveal, the recent development of social media as a societal
phenomenon has proven one of the biggest challenges for attorneys, litigants,
and courts alike grappling with the evidence preservation and spoliation is-
sues cropping up in litigation. Well before the advent of social media, courts
had already begun grappling with the ins and outs of other forms of ESI, such
as email.62 Consequently, attorneys have had a long time to caution their
clients about how what is expressed in email may later become fair game for
discovery, but it is only relatively recently that courts have begun exploring
the parameters of discoverability of social media content. Clients accustomed
to carefree tweeting and posting on Facebook are still, more often than not,
surprised to see their own social media activities used against them in litiga-
tion.63 So, too, are employers belatedly realizing some of the harsh realities
that can accompany a Bring Your Own Device workplace, where employees
may transact company business on the same smartphone on which they up-
date their Facebook status or tweet to friends.64 Thanks to the realities of the
Digital Age, evidence preservation and spoliation concerns must necessarily
include social media. Attorneys must update their litigation hold letters to
admonish clients about preserving social media content. Although more and
more attorneys are realizing the importance of seeking social media evidence
59. See Tyler Clementi, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/c/tyler clementiindex.html.
60. See id.; 'I Apologize,' Ex-Rutgers Student Says Before Going to Jail, N.Y.
TIMEs (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/nyregion/dharun-
ravi-convicted-in-webcam-spying-apologizes-before-going-to-jail.html.
61. Megan DeMarco, Rutgers Webcam Trial: Ravi Deleted Dozens of Text
Messages from Cell Phone, Expert Says, THE STAR-LEDGER (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/rutgers-webcamtrial-ravi-dele
.html.
62. See Kristen L. Mix, Discovery of Social Media, 40 COLo. LAW. 27, 32 (2011).
63. See generally Henry Z. Horbaczewski & Ronald I. Raether, BYOD: Bring Your
Own Device Know the Privacy and Security Issues Before Inviting Employee-
Owned Devices to the Party, 30.3 ACC DOCKET 70, 76 (2012).
64. See generally id. at 72.
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in discovery, they also would be well-advised to specifically reference it in
preservation letters to adverse parties or opposing counsel.65
Due to the potential for a spoliation finding to dramatically alter the
posture of a case, maintaining control over the universe of electronically
stored formation-including social media content-is more important than
ever for attorneys. As U.S. Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer recently observed
(as part of a broader analysis of the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure amendments):
In the past, particularly in an asymmetrical case (such as a simple
employee discrimination action brought under Title VII), plain-
tiff's counsel might have paid only fleeting attention to his or her
client's preservation obligation since it was presumed that the de-
fendant employer had possession, custody, or control of all the
relevant ESI. That confidence may be misplaced, however, with
the advent of social media. As one court recently observed, there
is "no principal reason to articulate different standards for the dis-
coverability of communications through email, text message, or
social media platforms." A party is presumed to have control over
their social networking accounts and relevant information on those
sites is discoverable. . . . Since the plaintiff controls when litiga-
tion commences, as well as the nature and scope of any claims
asserted, a plaintiff's attorney who does not take early and affirm-
ative steps to preserve social media content risks spoliation
sanctions.66
In short, while many of the same questions and concerns over preserva-
tion and spoliation of ESI apply equally to social media evidence, there are
aspects unique to the social networking realm.67 At first blush, one might
think that in a world where everything lives forever on the Internet and "de-
lete" no longer means "gone forever" thanks to digital forensic tools, con-
cerns about spoliation would be few and far between. However, as the
rapidly developing body of case law on spoliation and social media demon-
strates, the opposite is true. 68 As a result, complying with the duty to preserve
evidence in the Digital Age demands that lawyers and their clients address
65. See, e.g., Carr v. Bovis Lend Lease, No. 107413/10, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
6095, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012) (discussing a New York personal
injury case where the defendants served the plaintiff not only with discovery
requests for posts on Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, and YouTube, but also with
a Demand for the Preservation of Electronically Stored Information that specif-
ically referenced Facebook and other social media sites).
66. Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Schaffer, Looking Past the Debate: Proposed Revi-
sions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. COURTS L. REV. 180
(2013).
67. See generally Mix, supra note 62, at 29.
68. See generally id.
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social media not only in gathering evidence, but in implementing effective
protocols and procedures for preserving it as well.69
IV. CASES INVOLVING SPOLIATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA
With preservation and spoliation issues prominently featured in the ju-
risprudence of electronic evidence generally, what kind of guidance can they
lend to the discussion of spoliation of social media content? As it turns out,
questions regarding spoliation in the social networking context have been
circulating just about as long as the actual use of social media evidence.
However, the unique qualities of social networking communications raise in-
teresting questions that courts have not always addressed with other forms of
electronically stored information.70
For example, can a lawyer counsel a client to refrain from social media
activities, like posting on his Facebook wall or those of others? Certainly-a
party is under no obligation to create evidence for the other side, and it is
simply good lawyering to direct a client to avoid such conduct, just as one
would counsel a client to avoid any behavior that could later be used against
her.7' What about counseling a client not to delete evidence, but to take af-
firmative steps to keep such information from being readily available, such
as using the privacy settings on a Facebook profile to restrict it to "pri-
vate?"72 Initially, this would seem to be fairly logical, innocuous advice: i.e.,
do not destroy any evidence, but do not leave it out in the open for the public
to see, either. A proper discovery request will likely render any relevant con-
tent behind the privacy "screen" discoverable anyway, so what is the harm?73
As one court has suggested, however, under the right circumstances the mere
act of taking one's Facebook profile from publicly viewable to private can
give rise to an adverse inference.74
A. In re Platt
In re Platt was an adversary proceeding stemming from a state court
personal injury suit.75 Plaintiff Will Rhodes and Defendant Justin Platt had
gotten into a physical altercation at an Austin nightclub and bar, in which a
69. See NYCLA Opinion, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing the advice an attorney
may give a client regarding posts on social media sites).
70. See Mix, supra note 62, at 29 (discussing the dynamic distinction on the appli-
cability of federal rules for traditional ESI and social networking).
71. See generally NYCLA Opinion, supra note 17, at 1.
72. See generally id. at 2.
73. See generally id.
74. See In re Platt, No. 1 1-12367-CAG, 2012 WL 5337197, at *3 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. Oct. 29, 2012).
75. Id. at *1.
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beer glass was allegedly thrown at Rhodes' face, injuring him.76 Platt denied
that he had intended to injure Rhodes, claiming instead that he had planned
in good fun to pour the beer over Rhodes' head, only to be startled and toss
the glass in Rhodes' direction.77
Early on in the state court civil suit that Rhodes filed, Platt filed a Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy case. 78 Rhodes filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy
court, asserting that any debt arising from his injury would be nondischarge-
able under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code since Platt's conduct
was "willful and malicious."79 To determine if the conduct was indeed "will-
ful and malicious," the court had to examine Platt's behavior and credibility,
including his conduct after the incident, to see if Platt had the intent to injure
Rhodes.o The court pointed, in particular, to Platt's activity regarding his
Facebook account:
Defendant fled the bar immediately after the incident, breaking
part of the club's front door as he left. Although the bar staff were
initially able to identify Defendant by finding his Facebook ac-
count, Defendant made his Facebook account private soon after
the incident occurred. During the same time period, [he] removed
the last names-including his own-from a webpage promoting
his band.81
The court noted that this act in which "Defendant's account was 'made
private' such that an unknown third party searching for Defendant would no
longer be able to find him on Facebook," supported an adverse inference that
the Defendant acted with the specific intent to injure the Plaintiff, and there-
fore the debt was not dischargeable.82
B. New York County Lawyers Association Ethics Opinion 745
The Platt case raises issues that resonate with many lawyers wondering
just how far to go in counseling their clients. NYCLA Ethics Opinion 745
poses several questions about just what sort of advice is appropriate to give a
client regarding existing or proposed postings on social media sites, includ-
ing the following:
May attorneys advise clients about what should or should not be posted
on social media sites?
76. Id.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id. at *1
79. Id.
80. Platt, 2012 WL 5337197, at *3.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *3.
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May lawyers direct their clients to remove certain materials from ex-
isting social media profiles?
May lawyers counsel clients about the legal ramifications of their activi-
ties on social media? 83
The NYCLA opinion begins by describing that the modern practice en-
vironment in the Digital Age (not to mention society) is a very different
atmosphere from the one many attorneys experienced early in their careers.
It is commonplace to post travel logs, photographs, streams of con-
sciousness, rants, and all manner of things on websites so that family,
friends, or even the public-at-large can peer into one's life ... . For example,
teenagers and college students commonly post photographs of themselves
partying, binge drinking, indulging in illegal drugs or sexual poses, and the
like. The posters may not be aware, or may not care, that these posts may
find their way into the hands of family, potential employers, school admis-
sion offices, romantic contacts, and others. The content of a removed social
media posting may continue to exist, on the poster's computer, or in cyber-
space . . . . It is now common for attorneys and their investigators to seek to
scour litigant's social media pages for information and photographs. De-
mands for authorizations for access to passwords, protected portions of an
opposing litigant's social media site are becoming routine.84
The opinion then turns to cite previous ethics opinions that make it clear
that, ethically speaking, there is no restriction on attorneys accessing some-
one's publicly-viewable social media profile, although attorneys must still
avoid engaging in misrepresentation in order to gain information.85 Set
against this backdrop, the opinion then turns to the issue of privacy, noting
that all major social networking sites feature varying privacy settings and that
they exist for a reason. 86 Because of this, the opinion states, "[t]here is no
ethical restraint in advising a client to use the highest level of privacy/secur-
ity settings that is available. Such settings will prevent adverse counsel from
having direct access to the contents of the client's social media pages, requir-
ing adverse counsel to request access through formal discovery channels."87
While the result in the Platt case might indicate that such advice runs
the risk of costing the client an adverse inference, it is important to remember
that the court's ruling in Platt hinged on the totality of the circumstances and
the timing of Platt's sudden decision to make his profile private.88 Simply
directing a client to avail him or herself of the privacy settings available is no
different from counseling the client to pull the shade down at his house or to
83. See NYCLA Opinion, supra note 17, at 1.
84. Id. at 1-2.
85. Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See Platt, 2012 WL 5337197, at *2.
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avoid discussing the facts of the case with outsiders. The act of shielding
potentially discoverable information from prying eyes and ears is common-
sense, and it is hardly the equivalent of counseling a client to spoliate
evidence.
The opinion next asks whether an attorney may prescreen "what a client
posts on a social media site."89 It observes that part of providing competent
representation is the obligation to advise clients regarding what steps they
may take (within the bounds of the law and ethics) to mitigate any adverse
effects on the clients' position that might arise out of their use of social me-
dia.90 The opinion concludes that because of this, "an attorney may properly
review a client's social media pages, and advise the client that certain materi-
als posted on a social media page may be used against the client for impeach-
ment or similar purposes."91 The reasoning here is sound: just as a client
should not volunteer information beyond the bounds of answering a question
in a deposition, she should not engage in the digital equivalent by baring her
soul for all to see on her social networking profile, and it is simply good
lawyering to counsel a client about how information in a publicly-accessible
forum can come back to haunt her.
NYCLA Opinion 745 even goes on to remind attorneys that yet another
ethical obligation can come into play here: the ethical responsibility not to
"bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous."92 Frivolous
conduct, the opinion reminds us, "includes the knowing assertion of 'material
factual statements that are false.' "93 Accordingly, it is important for lawyers
to be aware of what their clients are posting on social media sites so that the
lawyers can avoid giving their implicit approval to conduct that reveals the
baselessness for a case. As the opinion details, "if a client's social media
posting reveals to an attorney that the client's lawsuit involves the assertion
of material false factual statements, and if proper inquiry of the client does
not negate that conclusion, the attorney is ethically prohibited from proffer-
ing, supporting or using those false statements."94 For similar reasons, the
opinion warns, lawyers must remain vigilant with regard to clients' altering
of their social media profiles.95 Because clients are required to testify truth-
fully at a deposition, trial, or other proceedings, and because lawyers may not
offer or use evidence the lawyer knows to be false (and may not fail to cor-
rect a false statement of material fact), lawyers have a duty to take "prompt




93. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
94. Id.
95. See NYCLA Opinion, supra note 17, at 4.
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remedial action" if a client does not answer truthfully when asked "whether
changes were ever made" to his social media site.96
Following the reasoning of this opinion, a lawyer should communicate
regularly with his client and be aware of his client's social media postings-
all sensible advice. Summarizing what a lawyer can do in terms of advising
the client of the realities of litigating in the age of Facebook and Twitter, the
opinion even provides a kind of checklist of tasks that a lawyer can do for his
client. The tasks include reviewing "what a client plans to publish on a social
media page in advance of publication, to guide the client appropriately, in-
cluding formulating a corporate policy on social media usage" and counsel-
ing the client/witness to publish truthful information favorable to the
lawyer's client; discuss the significance and implications of social media
posts (including their content and advisability); advise the client how social
media posts may be received and/or presented by the client's legal adversa-
ries and advise the client to consider the posts in that light; discuss the possi-
bility that the legal adversary may obtain access to 'private' social media
pages through court orders or compulsory process; review how the factual
context of the posts may affect their perception; review the posts that may be
published and those that have already been published; and discuss possible
lines of cross-examination.97
Again, all of this is sensible advice in any legal scenario that might be
impacted by social media posts. Attorneys can avoid the problem of contend-
ing with ongoing social media posting by insisting that, during the pendency
of the litigation or throughout the attorney-client relationship, the client re-
frain from engaging in any social media.98 However, the portion of NYCLA
Opinion 745 that has attracted the most attention (while receiving scant dis-
cussion in the opinion itself) is its answer to the second questions ad-
dressed-any lawyers instruct clients to "take down" certain materials from
existing social media sites?99 The opinion's answer is a qualified "yes," a
controversial position that would seem to sanction (in a positive way) the act
of spoliation of evidence. Although the opinion makes fleeting reference to
the fact that a duty to preserve evidence may arise under substantive law, it
concludes that:
provided that such removal does not violate the substantive law
regarding destruction or spoliation of evidence, there is no ethical
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 3. While not palatable to many clients, this approach may relieve a
lawyer of the pressure of playing "social media cop" to his client. In the course
of the author's own research, he has encountered a number of attorneys who
incorporate "social media bans" into their engagement agreement or initial cor-
respondence with clients setting forth the respective responsibilities of lawyers
and client.
99. See id. at 4.
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bar to "taking down" such material from social media publica-
tions, or prohibiting a client's attorney from advising the client to
do so, particularly in as much as the substance of the posting is
generally preserved in cyberspace or on the user's computer. 00
The opinion drops this bombshell and then moves on to an unrelated
point, offering no further explanation or rationale and providing no examples
or hypothetical scenarios by way of illustration. In fact, it drops the topic
entirely, only returning to offer a brief summary in the opinion's last line,
which states, "provided that there is no violation of the rules or substantive
law pertaining to the preservation and/or spoliation of evidence, an attorney
may offer advice as to what may be kept on 'private' social media pages, and
what may be 'taken down' or removed."101
In analyzing this apparent license to spoliate, one must examine both the
caveat and the justification provided. Cautioning attorneys that taking down
social media content damaging to the client's case is acceptable, as long as it
does not violate the ethical rules or substantive law is not quite the carte
blanche that some observers might think. It is somewhat akin to handing the
car keys to someone and saying, "You may drive as fast as you want, as long
as you obey the posted speed limits." Essentially, the only "limit" amidst the
rules and substantive law prohibiting spoliation that provides any sort of wig-
gle room that might permit deletion or destruction of evidence is the require-
ment of relevance. Cases have consistently pronounced that there can be no
sanction-worthy spoliation if the evidence is not relevant: i.e., the destroyed
or unavailable evidence would have been helpful to the movant.102 If the
social networking content taken down was not relevant, then, technically it is
not spoliation.
For example, a client who is the plaintiff in a personal injury case plans
to update her social media profile. She is an avid marathon runner, and fre-
quently posts pictures from her races along with her times on her Facebook
page. She is also a "foodie" who posts photos of meals on her Instagram
account. Taking down the Instagram photos would not equate to spoliation,
unless her eating habits somehow became relevant to her personal injury
claims. However, taking down the Facebook posts, either pre-accident or
post-accident, could constitute spoliation. Photos depicting her physical ca-
pabilities before the accident could certainly be relevant to the plaintiff's own
claims, while depictions of her successfully competing since could be rele-
vant to a defendant's position that she has fully recovered.
100. Id. at 3.
101. NYCLA Opinion, supra note 17, at 4.
102. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99,
108-09 (2d Cir. 2002); MRT, Inc. v. Vounckx, 299 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (articulating the standard that under Texas law, a
duty to preserve evidence only arises when the evidence in the party's posses-
sion or control "will be material and relevant" to the claim).
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However, while relevance is a prerequisite for a spoliation finding, who
decides what is relevant? In the social media context, the question of what
content is truly relevant and, therefore, discoverable continues to be the sub-
ject of discovery disputes. At the heart of this problem is the subjectivity that
often accompanies the analysis: what one party deems relevant may be con-
sidered irrelevant by another. At least one court confronted with a social
media discovery battle (in which the plaintiffs Facebook profile was about
750 pages long, and the plaintiff produced only 100 of those pages to the
defense) has recognized this "relevance is in the eye of the beholder"
dilemma:
Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user's relationships and
state of mind at the time of the content's posting. Therefore, rele-
vance of the content of the plaintiffs Facebook usage as to both
liability and damages in this case is more in the eye of the be-
holder than subject to strict demarcations, and production should
not be limited to Plaintiffs own determination of what may be
'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.'103
Another problem with the NYCLA Opinion's apparent blessing of tak-
ing down damaging content is its casual attempt at justification. It notes in
passing that "the substance of the posting is generally preserved in cyber-
space or on the user's computer." If this were a valid reason to intentionally
delete evidence-in today's world of digital forensics and hard drive mirror-
imaging, "delete" no longer means "delete"-it would undermine the core
principles behind punishing those who engage in spoliation. While the ability
to recover content is certainly a factor to be considered in assessing the de-
gree of punishment and the fact that the content can be recreated or electroni-
cally retrieved (albeit at some cost) militates in favor of a lesser measure, it
does not excuse the intent behind the original act itself of spoliation. NYCLA
Opinion 745 is deeply flawed in this respect, and it would be surprising to
see it form the basis of advice to clients to "go forth and spoliate."
C. Torres v. Lexington Insurance Co.
The earliest known social networking spoliation case not only illustrates
the fact that courts will regard spoliation of social media content by applying
concepts that apply to any other kind of evidence destruction, but it also
showed the value of preserving or capturing the opposition's incriminating
postings early on-just in case an attempt at spoliation is made. In Torres v.
Lexington Insurance Co., the plaintiff claimed to have been the victim of a
sexual assault while receiving a massage at a hotel spa in Puerto Rico.104
Following the incident, the plaintiff claimed she had developed "intense
103. Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 VL
3724968 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009).
104. Torres v. Lexington Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 533, 533 (D.P.R. 2006).
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mental anguish, feelings of shame, humiliation, depression, unworthiness,
weeping, and has been forced to undergo psychological treatment and ther-
apy."105 She further maintained that the assault had damaged her marriage,
hurt her job prospects, and left her a recluse with little, if any, social
interaction. 106
However, as the district court would later point out, "[a]t some point
during the case, defendants learned outside of discovery that [plaintiff] pos-
sessed several web pages depicting an active social life, and an aspiring sing-
ing and modeling career.107 These web pages were in direct contradiction to
[plaintiffs] assertions of continued and ongoing mental anguish."08 The
court went on to note that, at the time the web pages were discovered, neither
plaintiffs nor plaintiffs' counsel had knowledge that defense counsel had
made this discovery.109 Because of this, the defense was able to download
and print out much of the content of the web pages.Io Defense counsel sub-
sequently sent a preservation letter, informing plaintiffs counsel that "elimi-
nating or altering the sites could be considered spoliation or evidence
tampering."i II Alas, as the court pointed out, "[t]wo days after plaintiffs were
alerted about defendants' knowledge of the websites, the same were deleted
in their entirety. No plausible explanation has been offered for this."112
Not surprisingly, the defense moved for sanctions, asking that plaintiffs'
case be dismissed in its entirety or, alternatively, that her damages claims be
eliminated or reduced.113 The court was not amused. The court described
Torres' deletion of the social networking profile as an "unconscionable
scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability to impartially
adjudicate the matter or unfairly hamper the prosecution of the opposing
party's claims or defenses."14 The court went on to observe that, far from
coming clean about her acting and modeling aspirations, the plaintiff:
attempted to depict the life of a recluse with no or little social
interaction. Instead, [plaintiff] led an active social life and an-
nounced this information to the world by posting it on very public
[I]nternet sites. Then, immediately upon defendant's discovery of
evidence, which could be used to contradict or impeach her alle-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 533-34.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 534.
109. Id.







gations, [plaintiff] removed the information from the [I]nternet.
This is the type of unconscionable conduct the court seeks to
deter. 115
While the court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims in their entirety, it
did sanction her by "eliminat[ing] all possibility of introducing evidence of
continuous or ongoing mental anguish on her part."116 In a case where the
biggest component of damage is likely to be mental anguish, that is indeed a
harsh sanction.
Therefore, the Torres case illustrates two key points. First, practitioners
need to take measures to preserve any impeaching social media content as
soon as they encounter it. While this is an extreme case in which the actual
pages were taken down, less nefarious actions-such as changing a
Facebook profile picture-may occur in a far more routine fashion. When
information helpful to one's case is spotted online, it is critical that immedi-
ate steps be taken to preserve it, even with a screenshot. Second, this case
illustrates the importance of sending an early preservation letter. The Torres
letter from the defense was well-timed-right after the defense had discov-
ered and printed out the impeaching social media content. Pointing out that
the other side was warned, in the form of a preservation letter, not to engage
in spoliation and of the potential consequences of doing so can only reinforce
a moving party's later efforts to sanction the party who is accused of
spoliation.
D. Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc.
As mentioned earlier, not all purported spoliation is as blatant as the
Torres plaintiff's complete takedown of her profile. It is a common feature of
social networking users to update their profiles, change profile pictures, etc.
How should courts regard these less egregious actions? The 2011 case of
Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc. is a useful illustration.'17 This trade-
mark and trade dress infringement case involved two competing restaurants
selling similar types of food.'18 The court granted the plaintiffs request for
an injunction based on infringement of the restaurant's distinctive trade dress
and gave the defendant twenty days to change its infringing trade dress to
another color)19 The plaintiff also sought PDF copies of the defendant's
Facebook pages displaying the infringing trade dress.120 However, by the
time it attempted to create PDFs of the Facebook page in question, the defen-
115. Id.
116. Torres, 237 F.3d at 534.
117. Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc., No. 10-3620 GEB, 2011 WL 3583408
(D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2011).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id. at *3.
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dant had already changed its profile picture (the new image did not contain
the infringing trade dress) in an effort to comply with the court's order.121
The plaintiff moved for sanctions, seeking a spoliation inference due to the
changed profile picture.122
The court methodically went over the four-part test for a spoliation in-
ference, examining such factors as whether 1) the evidence was in the party's
control; 2) the evidence was actually suppressed or withheld; 3) the de-
stroyed evidence was relevant to the claims or defenses at issue; and 4) it was
reasonably foreseeable that the evidence in question would subsequently be
discoverable.123 The court had little difficulty concluding that the first and
third factors were met, but it struggled with the second and fourth require-
ments.124 While ultimately determining that the loss of information was
"somewhat prejudicial," the court found that, despite the fact that the defen-
dant owner knew that he had to preserve evidence, it would not have been
immediately clear that changing his profile picture "would undermine dis-
coverable evidence."25 The court came to this ruling even though changing
the profile picture admittedly "changes the picture associated with each and
every post that user has made in the past."l26
In this case, the court also considered the unique features of social
networking sites. Chief Judge Brown found it "hardly surprising" the defen-
dant changed the profile picture, noting that "the change of a profile picture
on Facebook is a common occurrence," and "[a]ctive users often change their
pictures weekly."27 Finding that the spoliation was not intentional and im-
posing a lesser negligence standard for the spoliation conduct, the court de-
clined plaintiffs request for an adverse inference instruction.128 Instead, the
court crafted its own solution and directed the defendant to post the image of
the allegedly infringing photo for a designated period of time so that the
plaintiff could then print relevant posts as evidence for the trial in the case.129
Thereafter, the defendant would be permitted to re-post its non-infringing
profile picture.130 Chief Judge Brown stated that concluding otherwise would
be "unjust."31
121. Id. at *3.
122. Id.
123. Katiroll, 2011 WL 3583408, at *1.
124. Id. at *4.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id. at *4.
128. Id.
129. Katiroll, 2011 WL 3583408, at *4.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *3.
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The Katiroll case is a useful demonstration of how courts should con-
sider the actual prejudice or harm to the moving party in a spoliation claim
before determining what level of sanction would be appropriate: an adverse
inference instruction for the jury, dismissal of certain claims, or a lesser pen-
alty.132 Yet at the same time, this case shows that an understanding of the
very nature and features of social networking sites can be critical when fash-
ioning novel solutions when spoliation occurs in the social media context.133
E. Patel v. Havana Bar, Restaurant & Catering
Another 2011 federal court case also provides a useful illustration of the
varying ways in which spoliation can occur in the world of social media, as
well as the appropriateness of lesser sanctions when warranted by the
facts.134 Patel v. Havana Bar, Restaurant & Catering appears at first glance
to be a garden-variety premises liability case.135 On September 8, 2007,
plaintiff Yogesh Patel was at the Havana Bar & Restaurant to attend an en-
gagement party when he allegedly fell from a balcony and sustained personal
injuries.136 His federal court complaint alleged multiple claims, including
dangerous conditions at the restaurant as well as purportedly being over-
served alcohol while already intoxicated, but the tale devolved into one of
spoliation on both sides.137 Havana Bar owner Mark Stevens allegedly
viewed surveillance footage from the time of the incident, but was unable to
preserve it, and contacted his system's provider.138 However, he apparently
failed to follow up with the provider, and the footage was lost.139
On the plaintiff's side, a game of social networking "hide and seek" was
taking place and as the plaintiff seemed to shift the emphasis in the case from
one theory of liability to another, so too did Facebook messages change.140 In
2008, Sruti Patel (the plaintiffs sister-in-law) sent out a Facebook message
to those who attended the party, soliciting favorable witness statements of
what happened that night, stating,
We're just asking that everyone give accurate accounts of the
night because we all know [Yogesh] did not drink enough to be
wasted by that point and we all know that the kid is always acting
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Patel v. Havana Bar, Rest. & Catering, No. 10-1383, 2011 WL 6029983
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011).
135. See id.
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id.
140. Patel, 2011 WL 6029983, at *2-3.
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crazy even when he's sober because he just loves being the life of
the party.141
But by 2010, Sruti was changing course due to plaintiffs counsel's
change in focus and sent out a Facebook message seeking witness statements
averring that Yogesh did not jump, but rather "fell over the railing."42
As troubling as the two Facebook solicitations seeking inconsistent
statements were, to compound the situation, the plaintiff failed to produce
any of the witness statements he received in response to the 2008 Facebook
message. 14 3 In fact, the 2010 Facebook message had gone so far as to request
that previous witness statements be revised to reflect the "new version" of
events, and that statements that were not favorable would not be "included"
in what Sruti Patel was gathering to provide to plaintiffs counsel.144 Only
after a witness, during her deposition, acknowledged that he had given a
statement did plaintiffs counsel produce any witness statements. 145 Even at
that point, only statements responsive to the 2010 Facebook solicitation were
turned over; none of the 2008 witness statements were produced.146 When
Sruti Patel was deposed, she testified that the Facebook messages had been
pasted into a Microsoft Word document that was printed before all digital
copies of it were deleted.147
The defense sought the ultimate sanction for the spoliation-outright
dismissal of the plaintiffs claims.148 Applying the traditional four-factor test,
the court agreed that sanctions were warranted:
First, the 2008 witness statements were in Plaintiff of Plaintiffs
family's possession prior to their disappearance. In addition, the
statements have never been produced, and the Plaintiffs conduct
with respect to the statements, as well as the conduct of his wife
and sister-in-law, is very suspect. Furthermore, the statements are
relevant as they are witness accounts of the night in question.
Lastly, it was reasonably foreseeable that the statements would
later be sought in discovery given that witness testimony as to
Plaintiffs appearance is crucial to his claim.149
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *4.
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id. at *4.
146. Patel, 2011 WL 6029983, at *4.
147. Id.




But the court stopped short of the ultimate sanction of dismissal by
holding that such a remedy should only be granted in the most serious of
circumstances.150 Any such decision would depend on the consideration of
six factors: 1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) the
prejudice caused to the adversary; 3) any history of dilatoriness; 4) whether
the conduct was willful or in bad faith; 5) the extent to which sanctions short
of dismissal would be effective; and 6) how meritorious the claim or defense
is. 15 Based on all of these considerations (and likely the defendant's own
spoliation with the video footage), the court granted an adverse inference
instruction request, thus allowing the jury to draw its own conclusion about
what the evidence would have revealed had the plaintiff been forthcoming.152
The court also ordered that the defendant be allowed to re-depose several of
the plaintiff's witnesses (since their statements had not been furnished prior
to their earlier depositions), and awarded defense counsel $20,000 for attor-
ney's fees and costs associated with trying to obtain the 2008 and 2010 wit-
ness statements. 153
The Patel case illustrates not only the importance for attorneys of being
aware of what their clients (and, as it turns out, their clients' families) may be
up to on Facebook during the pendency of a lawsuit, but also the fact that
courts will carefully scrutinize all relevant factors in an effort at crafting a
remedy that addresses spoliation and wrongful conduct while stopping short
of the "death penalty" sanction of dismissal.154
F. Cajamarca v. Regal Entertainment Group
In this fairly entertaining sexual harassment case, a box office cashier in
one of the defendant Regal's theaters complained that a coworker had ex-
posed himself and masturbated in front of her in the break room, a claim
vehemently denied by the defense.155 The court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, in part due to electronic evidence that-once recovered
after the plaintiff had deleted data from her laptop-seriously undermined
the plaintiffs assertions as well as her credibility. As the court observed,
there was "little doubt" that the spoliated data "contained pornography and
communications that would have undermined her claim regarding the extent
of the trauma she suffered as a result of the break room incident, especially
since she had prior convictions for prostitution, had worked as a call girl, and
150. Id.
151. Id. at *11 n.5.
152. Patel, 2011 WL 6029983, at *10.
153. Id. at *11.
154. See id.
155. Cajamarca v. Regal Entm't Grp., 2012 WL 3782437 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012).
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had a rather fulsome sexual history, including an interest in sado-masoch-
ism."156 The court went on to note:
Plaintiff lied at her deposition, and to her own expert psychiatrist,
in describing the emotional effects of the break room incident and
omitting her own sexual history. In fact, she enjoyed an extraordi-
narily active travel and social life during the time she described
herself as being "bedridden" and in a "vegetative state" as a result
of the incident, including enjoying in sexual banter with friends on
Facebook.157
In entertaining a subsequent motion for sanctions against plaintiffs counsel,
the court concluded that it was undisputed that the lawyer "never advised her
to preserve the data on the hard drive on her laptop," and that plaintiff had
"deleted information that would be relevant to her claim of PTSD, including
social media communications." Finding that the defendants had been
prejudiced by the obstruction of discovery by both the plaintiff and her attor-
ney, the court awarded $3,000 in sanctions against the plaintiffs counsel,
along with court costs.158
The Cajamarca case underscores the need for attorneys to counsel their
clients appropriately to preserve social media content, but also undertake
their own due diligence in reviewing the clients' online selves. As this case
illustrates, most reputable lawyers would have thought long and hard before
bringing a sexual harassment case on behalf of someone with a history of
prostitution and many other skeletons in her digital closet.
G. Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Making a Facebook profile private, changing Facebook profile pictures,
and failing to turn over witness statements solicited via Facebook may get a
party into trouble, but what about deactivating one's Facebook account dur-
ing the middle of discovery? That was the situation confronted by the New
Jersey federal court in Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc.159 Frank Gatto, a bag-
gage handler at JFK Airport, brought a personal injury suit after being struck
by a set of stairs used for aircraft refueling on January 21, 2008.160 Gatto
sued Allied Aviation Services (which owned the stairs) and United Airlines
(which owned the plane), claiming to be permanently disabled, unable to
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In July 2011, the defendants sought discovery pertaining to Gatto's so-
cial media activities, asking for Facebook "posts, comments, status updates,
and other information posted [by the defendant before the accident.]"62
United Airlines also sent Gatto authorization forms for him to sign that
would permit social media and sites such as eBay and PayPal to release his
information.163 Other discovery requests inquired more specifically into
Gatto's mentions of the accident on social media and, also, any eBay busi-
ness operated by Gatto.164 Gatto signed the authorization forms for all sites
except for Facebook, but ultimately, following a December 1, 2011 confer-
ence before U.S. Magistrate Judge Cathy Waldor, the plaintiff was ordered to
execute this authorization as well.165 Gatto agreed to change his Facebook
password to "alliedunited" for the purpose of defense counsel accessing doc-
uments and information from his Facebook account. 166
From this point, the case sharply diverges. Gatto claimed that he thought
there would not be "unauthorized access to the Facebook account online,"
and his attorney claimed he understood that defense counsel would use the
changed password to obtain information from Facebook's corporate offices
rather than through online access.' 67 In any event, as of December 5, 2011,
Gatto had not yet changed the password, prompting United's attorney to con-
tact plaintiffs counsel and request that it be done that day.168 It was, and
defense counsel was able to access Gatto's Facebook account and print off
certain materials that day.169
On December 6, Gatto was notified by Facebook that his account had
been accessed by an unknown IP address in New Jersey. Gatto, claiming that
he had been through contentious divorce proceedings and was worried about
his account being "hacked into," deactivated his Facebook account on De-
cember 16, 2011, because "unknown people were apparently accessing my
account without my permission."170 Facebook automatically deleted the data
on December 30, 2011.17, Gatto maintained that he was unaware that
United's counsel was the one accessing his account until later.172
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id. at *1.
164. Id.
165. Gatto, 2013 WL 1285285, at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *2.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Gatto, 2013 WL 1285285, at *1.
172. Id. at *2.
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Meanwhile, the attorneys were oblivious to these developments.
Facebook advised United's counsel that it would not disclose Gatto's data,
but Gatto himself could download the account contents through a "download
my profile" button. It was agreed during a January 6, 2012 conference with
Judge Waldor that Gatto would download the contents of his Facebook pro-
file, and then provide a copy to the defense along with a certification that he
had not made any changes to it since the December 1 conference.173 Two
weeks later, Plaintiffs counsel had to inform the defense of Gatto's account
deactivation and the sad fact that once an account is deleted or deactivated, it
cannot be reactivated.174
As one would expect, the defendants moved for sanctions based on spo-
liation, claiming not only that the deactivation was intentional, but also that,
had all the lost postings been recovered, they would have refuted Gatto's
damages claims.175 Gatto maintained that there was no intentional destruction
or suppression of evidence.176
The court disagreed with Gatto, pointing out that:
Even if plaintiff did not intend to permanently deprive the defend-
ants of the information associated with his Facebook account,
there is no dispute that Plaintiff intentionally deactivated the ac-
count. In doing so, and then failing to reactivate the account
within the necessary time period, plaintiff effectively caused the
account to be permanently deleted. Neither defense counsel's al-
legedly inappropriate access of the Facebook account, nor Plain-
tiff's belated efforts to reactivate the account, negate the fact that
plaintiff failed to preserve the relevant evidence.177
Applying the familiar four-factor test for spoliation, the court easily
concluded that the evidence was 1) within a party's control; 2) relevant; and
3) reasonably foreseeable that it would be discoverable.178 With the fourth
factor-whether or not there was "an actual suppression or withholding" of
evidence-the court struggled a bit before finding that this prong, too, had
been satisfied.179 In weighing the appropriate sanction, U.S. District Judge
Mannion ultimately declined to assess monetary sanctions since Gatto's "de-
struction of evidence does not appear to be motivated by fraudulent purposes
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *4. The limited materials printed out by defense counsel purportedly
showed Gatto taking vacations, participating in social activities, and running an
eBay business.
176. Id.
177. Gatto, 2013 WL 1285285, at *24.
178. Id. at *3.
179. Id. at *4.
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or diversionary tactics, and the loss of evidence will not cause unnecessary
delay."180 However, the court did grant the defense's request that an instruc-
tion be given at trial to the jury that it may draw an adverse inference against
Gatto for failing to preserve his Facebook account and for intentional de-
struction of evidence.181
As this recent case shows, with social media evidence playing an in-
creasingly pivotal role in litigation courts have embraced its importance, are
very willing to consider deleting such data as spoliation, and assess punish-
ment accordingly. Yet Gatto should also serve as a cautionary tale, not only
for litigants, but also for their attorneys. Allowing any kind of unfettered
access to a client's social networking account is never a good idea, and as the
Gatto case illustrates, a number of misunderstandings can ensue.182 Nar-
rowly-tailored discovery requests are always preferable to the broad, global
"give us your entire Facebook profile" type of request.
Additionally, client communication and careful drafting of discovery
rulings and agreements are key, and could very well have avoided the Gatto
scenario in which the attorneys on each side have different concepts of how
the access will take place (i.e., via Facebook's corporate offices or by di-
rectly accessing the account itself with the changed password). Plaintiff's
counsel was unaware of his client's actions before making representations on
his behalf in a conference with the court. Finally, the attorneys on both sides
would have benefited from being more familiar with social networking sites
and their functionality, as well as with the severe limitations of seeking infor-
mation directly from a site like Facebook.
H. Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester
Allied Concrete v. Lester is arguably the most talked-about case of so-
cial networking spoliation, where the issue of attorney involvement in and
direction of a party's obstructionist efforts regarding social media evidence
comes to fruition.183 Lester looked like a slam-dunk wrongful death case for
the plaintiffs attorney: on June 21, 2007, a speeding Allied Concrete cement
truck crossed the center line, tipped over, and crushed the vehicle containing
Jessica Lester.184 Jessica, a young wife, later died from her injuries.185 Liabil-
ity was not an issue-the cement truck driver pleaded guilty to manslaugh-
180. Id. at *5.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., John G. Browning, With "Friends" Like This, Who Needs Enemies?
Passwords, Privacy, and the Discovery of Social Media Content, 36 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 505 (Spring 2013) (discussing the recent trend in favor of re-
jecting parties' demands for an opponent's Facebook passwords).
183. See Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 736 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 2013).
184. Id. at 701.
185. Id.
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ter.186 The surviving husband, Isaiah Lester, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in
May 2008.187 He had capable counsel-Matthew B. Murray, a partner in the
largest plaintiffs personal injury firm in the state and a past president of the
Virginia Trial Lawyers Association. In December 2010, a Charlottesville,
Virginia jury awarded Mr. Lester $8.58 million in damages (Jessica Lester's
surviving parents each received $1 million).188
Interestingly, a curious thing happened on the way to the courthouse. On
January 9, 2009-while the lawsuit was pending-Isaiah Lester sent a mes-
sage on Facebook to one of the defense attorneys at Patton Boggs, David
Tafuri.189 No court order or pleading has ever explained this bizarre turn of
events, but in an interview with the author, Mr. Tafuri shed some light:
Mr. Lester sent me a message on Facebook, saying something
along the lines of "see you in March," referring to an upcoming
trial setting. It was meant as kind of a taunt-that's the kind of
plaintiff Lester was. On Facebook at that time, that message
opened up his profile for viewing. I did not respond to his mes-
sage, since it would be unethical to communicate with him di-
rectly and not go through his attorney.190
The defense printed off a number of photos from Lester's Facebook
page thanks to his inadvertent invitation, and on March 25, 2009, the defense
counsel issued a discovery request to the plaintiff, seeking "screen print cop-
ies on the day this request is signed of all pages from Isaiah Lester's
Facebook page including, but not limited to, all pictures, his profile, his mes-
sage board, status updates, and all messages sent or received."'9' Attached to
the discovery request was a copy of one of the photographs Mr. Tafuri had
downloaded off of Lester's Facebook page.192 It depicted Lester surrounded
by women, holding a beer can, and wearing a T-shirt that reads "I [heart] hot
moms"-not quite the portrait of a grieving widower!I93 That evening, Mr.
Murray sent an email to his client about the discovery request and the at-
tached photo.194 The following day, Murray instructed his paralegal to have
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ups of this stuff at trial."I95 The paralegal emailed Lester (as part of a thread
that would later be referred to as "the stink bomb email") directing him to
"clean up" his Facebook page because "[w]e do NOT want blow ups of other
pics at trial so please, please clean up your [F]acebook and [M]yspace!"96
On April 14, 2009, Lester informed the paralegal that he had deleted his
Facebook page.197 The next day, plaintiffs counsel served an answer to the
discovery request, with Lester's statement that "I do not have a Facebook
page on the date this is signed, April 15, 2009."198 Allied Concrete's lawyers
filed a motion to compel, and plaintiff's counsel contacted Lester.199 He reac-
tivated his Facebook page, and his lawyers were able to print off copies of
what was then on the profile; however, consistent with the advice to "clean
up" his Facebook page, Lester had already deleted at least sixteen photos
from his profile.200 However, according to Mr. Tafuri, there was evidence to
suggest that considerably more than sixteen photos had been deleted, but the
defense forensics expert was only able to definitively show spoliation of six-
teen photos.201
In May and October 2009, plaintiff's counsel provided additional, "up-
dated" copies of Lester's Facebook page.202 At a December 2009 deposition,
Lester denied deactivating his Facebook page, but Allied Concrete would
later subpoena Facebook and obtain testimony that contradicted Lester.203
As a sanction for the spoliation, the trial court gave two adverse infer-
ence instructions to the jury (one while Lester was testifying, the other before
closing arguments), instructing them to presume "that the photograph or pho-
tographs [Lester] deleted from his Facebook account were harmful to his
case."204 The court also sanctioned Lester and his attorney $722,000 for their
misconduct ($542,000 against Murray and $180,000 against Lester) and to
cover Allied Concrete's attorney's fees and costs in addressing the Facebook
spoliation.205 The court, in response to a motion for new trial, also sharply
195. Id.
196. Id.
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reduced the plaintiffs verdict by $4.127 million, but ostensibly for reasons
unrelated to the spoliation.206 In his order sanctioning the Plaintiff and plain-
tiff's counsel, Charlottesville Circuit Judge Edward Hogshire was appalled at
the spoliation and misconduct on the plaintiffs side, referring to "the exten-
sive pattern of deceptive and obstructionist conduct of Murray and Lester." 207
However, he denied the defense's request for a new tria.208
In January 2013, the Virginia Supreme Court vacated the remittitur and
reinstated the original verdict, but the sanctions levied against Murray and
Lester remained in place.209 It upheld Judge Hogshire's denial of the defen-
dant's motion for new trial, holding that "Allied Concrete was fully aware of
the misconduct of Murray and Lester prior to trial and the trial court took
significant steps to mitigate the effect of the misconduct."210
Was this the correct result? Probably so; after all, the trial court levied
whopping sanctions in response to the spoliation and related misconduct, and
gave an adverse inference instruction to the jury. When applying one factor
in any instance of spoliation to the Lester case-the prejudice or harm to the
moving party-Allied Concrete suffered relatively little prejudice in the
sense it had the relevant evidence available at trial, although it was initially
unavailable due to plaintiffs deletion.
More importantly, Lester leaves an important legacy for lawyers and
litigants alike. First of all, lawyers should know what their clients are doing.
Allied Concrete stumbled across Lester's digital treasure trove only because
he chose to tauntingly communicate with a defense attorney on Facebook-
not the smartest move. Second, Lester underscores the importance of law-
yers' duty of competent representation encompassing familiarity with the
risks and benefits of technology. Murray should have known enough about
Facebook, or retained someone with enough knowledge, to not attempt the
misconduct and misrepresentations that were made. When an attorney sends
opposing counsel discovery requests with the opposing party's Facebook pic-
tures, he clearly already has most, if not all, of what he is seeking. Murray
even went so far as to accuse the defense of hacking into his client's
Facebook account in a motion for sanctions, which was denied, and for
which Murray himself was sanctioned.
As a postscript, Murray later resigned from his firm. That, however, did
not shield him from Virginia State Bar disciplinary charges. After a Bar in-
206. Id. at 704.
207. Lester v. Allied Concrete Co., 2011 WL 9688369, 4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21,
2011).
208. Id.




vestigation found misconduct, Murray faced a disciplinary hearing.211 Prior
to that taking place, he and the Virginia State Bar entered into an agreed
disposition of the charges, which were based on violations of candor, fairness
to opposing parties and counsel, and engaging in "dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation."212 On July 17, 2013, Murray's law license was sus-
pended for five years. 213
V. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
At least one commentator has made a Swiftian "modest proposal" for
dealing with the information overload that comes with the ever-expanding
world of electronic communications subject to discovery.214 "Without a
showing of extraordinary circumstances by the requesting party," says Doug-
las J. Good, "treat electronic communications like conversation and eliminate
production of electronic communications in either electronic or hard copy
format."215 Such an approach is unlikely at best in an increasingly complex
world of discovery in the Digital Age, as people share more than ever using a
bewildering array of digital platforms that almost render Facebook quaint by
comparison. Lawyers will continue to push the envelope of electronic discov-
ery as long as individuals increasingly share more of themselves online, hop-
ing for the ever-elusive smoking gun piece of evidence.
In today's world, a spoliation claim may never even get out of the gate,
thanks to the self-editing applications that currently populate the Internet.
Want to delete your web history to thwart Google's combining of your online
browsing history with data from YouTube and Google Plus? The Electronic
Frontier Foundation will give you step-by-step directions. Want to "moder-
ate" (i.e., delete) the comments on your own Facebook posts? As of May
2013, there is an Android app for that.216 Want to go in the opposite direc-
211. Lawyer in Wrongful-Death Suit Murray Faces Disciplinary Hearing, DAILY
PROGRESS (July 9, 2013), http://www.dailyprogress.com/newslocal/lawyer-in-
wrongful-death-suit-murray-faces-disciplinary-hearing/article_2ecdlc58-e8f9-
S1e2-aal0-001a4bcf6878.html.
212. Bryan McKenzie, Charlottesville Attorney's Law License Suspended, DAILY
PROGRESS (July 30, 2013), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/charlottesville-
attorney-s-law-license-suspended/article_8c84b89a-f990-1 I e2-9 I d5-0019bb30
f3 1 a.html.
213. Disciplinary System Actions, VIRGINIA STATE BAR, http://www.vsb.org/disci-
plinary.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
214. See Douglas J. Good, A Modest Proposal to Resolve the E-Discovery Crisis,
N.Y. L.J., May 16, 2011, available at http://rmfpc.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/1 0/GoodModestProposal.pdf.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Jason Cipriani, How to Delete Facebook Activity Using iPhone, Android App,
CNET (Aug. 1, 2013), http://howto.cnet.com/8301-11310_39-57477912-285/
how-to-delete-facebook-activity-using-iphone-android-app.
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tion, and locate those deleted tweets that some elected official or celebrity
probably never should have tweeted in the first place? If you did not feel like
researching the 73 billion or so tweets archived by the Library of Congress,
you could have had an easier time by consulting the site Undetweetable-at
least until it shut down at Twitter's request. 2 17
Tinkering with existing platforms, however, is not the only factor that
may impact considerations of spoliation. New technology is making it easier
for a person's bad decisions to vanish into thin air. Consider Snapchat, a
photo-messaging application developed by four Stanford students in Septem-
ber 2011. Snapchat purportedly allows users to take photos or record videos,
add text, and send them to a controlled list of recipients; the user sets a time
limit (up to 10 seconds) for how long recipients can view the photo-after
which it will be deleted from the recipient's device and Snapchat's servers.
The app has been very successful, particularly in the 13-25 year-old demo-
graphic. As of May 2013, users were uploading over 150 million photos us-
ing Snapchat.2 18 But Snapchat has not existed without controversy. Critics
say it has encouraged teens to "sext" inappropriate photos to each other. In
May 2013, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a complaint
against Snapchat with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), claiming the
company's representations that pictures self-destruct within seconds of view-
ing was deceptive, since a number of experts report that photos can be re-
trieved well after the expiration of their time limits.219
Wickr is a security-focused app that uses military-grade encryption to
send text, video, voice, and document files that can self-destruct after a des-
ignated period of time.220 Similarly, the Android app Gryphn serves as an
encryption tool for text messages, videos, and images; such encryption
makes it difficult for recipients to "capture" the information sent through a
screen grab or other methods.221 Ansa, an app that promises its users that
"you can communicate off the record, so no trace of your conversation is left
behind," deletes messages and media seconds after being read-from the
217. Sarah Anne Hughes, Undetweetable Archives Deleted Tweets, Gets Warning
from Twitter, WASH. PosT (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/blogpost/post/undetweetable-archives-deleted-tweets-gets-waming-from-
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218. Maude Standish, New Tech Makes Our Bad Decisions Disappear, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maude-standish/new-
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sender's mobile device, the recipient's mobile device, and Ansa's servers.
This "self-destruct option," for those prone to drunk texting or other exer-
cises in poor judgment, is free and available for iOS as well as Android
devices. 222
However, few tools have attracted the attention that Vaporstream has
when it comes to keeping electronic communications confidential by adding
a "vanishing act" component. 223 When Vaporstream software is installed on a
computer or smartphone, messages disappear from the sender's device as
soon as they are sent, and vanish from the recipient's device as soon as they
are read or replied.224 The software itself is peer-to-peer, so unlike email, the
messages are never stored on an intermediate server. 225 Vaporstream's limita-
tions are straightforward but daunting: you can use it only to communicate
with other subscribers, like top executives at a given company, and it comes
with a hefty price tag costing as much as $25,000 per month for as many as
fifty employees.226
According to Vaporstream's website, Vaporstream does not create ESI
and "[mlessages cannot be intercepted, copied, forwarded, printed, stored or
even traced."227 Moreover, Vaporstream's developers seem to have antici-
pated the typical lawyer questions. Preservation obligations and litigation
holds would not apply, according to the Vaporstream website, since "[u]sing
Vaporstream would be no different than talking face-to-face over lunch or at
the water cooler."228 Elsewhere, the site says reassuringly that "[j]ust because
Vaporstream does not create a record in the first place, does not make one
guilty of spoliation."229 Vaporstream boasts that it protects the private infor-
mation "of over 150 corporate customers," ranging from the military and
government entities, to banking and financial institutions, healthcare compa-
nies, and even law firms.230
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What are the legal implications of technology seemingly engineered to
frustrate the efforts of a legal system that has carefully cultivated a body of
jurisprudence to protect against those who would thwart discovery? Could
white-collar criminals use a product like Vaporstream for insider trading
tips? Vaporstream CEO Jim Howe says he is aware of at least 31 cases in
which lawyers tried to introduce evidence of a company's use of Vapor-
stream-none of which succeeded, according to Howe. 23 1 There are those
who welcome advances in technology that would allow electronic communi-
cations, like the Mission: Impossible tapes of the 1960s television show, to
"self-destruct in five seconds." Tarun Wadhwa observes that "[t]he same
generation being blamed for the supposed 'death of privacy' has become
wiser than those who are criticizing them."232
Thanks to technology, concerns over spoliation of evidence have moved
past more mundane worries about shredding documents to confronting a
world of seemingly endless data and metadata being shared (some might say
overshared) with the frightening speed of a search engine on social network-
ing platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. The permanence of the
Internet has ensured that even the most questionable digital legacies on some
individual's social media profiles will live on in cyber-infamy-what Jimmy
Buffett might describe as a "permanent reminder of a temporary feeling."233
As the cases analyzing spoliation in the social media context illustrate,
the law continues to struggle with the application of 20th century (and ear-
lier) concepts to 21st century technology. Sadly, the most consistent theme
throughout the social media spoliation cases discussed in this article is that of
casual disregard for, or even discomfort with, the social networking plat-
forms that now permeate our lives. Litigants freely and casually post the
most intimate details of their lives online-digital intimacy having become
the new norm-only to be outraged over the violation of "privacy" as they
are hoisted on their own digital petard during discovery. Meanwhile, lawyers
and judges continue to wrestle with the challenges that social media content
presents to the traditional litigation framework of discovery and evidentiary
issues. As technology continues to advance toward more quicksilver modes
of communication, lawyers and judges have no choice but to acknowledge
the new reality: being competent means knowing the benefits and risks that
technology poses to one's practice and consciously choosing to leave dino-
saurs behind in favor of avatars.
231. Hechler, supra note 226.
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